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Abstract
We model the link between inequality, lack of political commitment, and ex-
cessive risk taking. If politicians cannot commit to a long-term tax schedule,
increasing returns to tax avoidance induce the middle class to take on non
rewarded nancial risk despite risk aversion. Electoral pressure may lead an
incumbent politician to endorse this excessive risk taking if income inequal-
ities are large. By increasing the scope for tax avoidance, globalization of
capital and human capital markets might have increased nancial fragility.
"We dont pay taxes. Only the little people pay taxes."
Leona Helmsley
1 Introduction
Following the 2007-2009 crisis, substantial attention has been devoted to de-
ciphering the build-up of risk in the U.S. nancial system. Numerous studies
have underlined the role played by market failures, incentive problems and
regulatory loopholes within the nancial and banking sectors. For instance,
it is frequently argued that articially low interest rates induced excessive
risk taking by fund managers searching for yield, a view expressed by
e.g. Diamond and Rajan (2009), Rajan (2005), or Stiglitz (2010). Other
studies emphasize the fact that nancial institutions had poor incentives to
monitor borrower quality because they were transferring risks through secu-
ritization to nal investors that were subsidized or unsophisticated (Parlour
and Plantin, 2008, Purnanandam, 2010, Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). Yet, for
others, the belief that the Fed would bail out "too big" or "too many to fail"
institutions triggered excess exposure to common risk factors (see e.g. Fahri
and Tirole, 2011). Such excessive risk taking was facilitated by lax pru-
dential supervision, and by the spectacular growth of a largely unregulated
"shadow banking" sector.
Overall, these analyses point at sources of nancial instability that are
internal to the nancial sector. Without denying their key role in the un-
folding of the crisis, this paper focusses on sources of instability that are
external to the nancial system. We aim at putting nancial instability in
a broader perspective than that of the nancial sector. Namely we show
that political economy frictions may generate a demand for ine¢ cient risk
taking in the face of rising inequality. In our framework, the high level of
risk undertaken by U.S. citizens collectively can be interpreted as the equi-
librium outcome of imperfect taxation and political forces. In particular,
we uncover a link between the increase of inequality and the build-up of
nancial risk. In doing so, our paper joins the voices of several scholars who
have underlined a potential causal channel between inequality and nancial
fragility (see e.g. Rajan, 2010 and Krugman, 2010).
The distribution of pre-tax income and wealth should in principle be
irrelevant, unless redistribution is plagued by important frictions. Our model
builds on such frictions. We consider an endowment economy populated by
agents with identical preferences. Utilitarian welfare is thus maximal when
transfers equate consumption across agents. Our rst departure from this
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rst-best is the introduction of a tax avoidance technology with increasing
returns to scale. This limits the taxation of the most a­ uent agents. Section
2motivates this assumption of increasing returns to scale for legal and quasi-
legal tax avoidance. We fully solve a Mirrlees program in the presence of
such tax avoidance. The optimal tax scheme features a convex kink in the
mapping of gross to net wealth: Taxes are regressive for the wealthiest.
Second, we assume that individuals in this economy have the ability to
add risk to their endowments, and that the tax authority cannot commit to
a tax scheme before such risk-taking decisions are made. The expectation
of an ex post optimal tax scheme that is regressive for the wealthiest creates
a demand for ine¢ cient risk taking. Some members of the middle class are
willing to add risk to their consumption without being compensated for it
by a positive risk premium. We fully characterize this demand for excessive
risk taking, and the resulting erosion of the middle-class.
In sum, the combination of increasing returns to tax avoidance and tax-
ation with limited commitment creates a strong relationship between in-
equality and excessive risk taking. The anticipation of important post-tax
inequality induces individuals to take excessive risk, and this in turn en-
dogenously increases pre-tax inequality.
We also o¤er an extension of the model in which taxation power accrues
to the winner of an election between an incumbent politician and a chal-
lenger. The incumbent politician has the ability to ban excessive risk taking
by individuals before voting takes place. We show that if, however, voting
has a retrospective component (as is empirically observed), then the incum-
bent politician may prefer to endorse ine¢ cient risk taking. We interpret
such an endorsement as the adoption of lax nancial regulation and pru-
dential supervision. The right tail of pre-tax wealth distribution drives the
politicians decision. In the presence of important inequalities in the form
of a fat right tail, the politician endorses excessive risk taking because the
bulk of the risk takers take bets with a high probability of success. This will
induce them in turn to vote for him with a high probability. If, conversely,
wealth distribution is more even, then the incumbent prefers to discourage
the electorally costly long-shot bets that the middle class would otherwise
contemplate. Thus this political friction creates an additional link between
inequality and excessive risk taking, whereby high pre-tax inequality may
induce the o¢ cial endorsement of ine¢ cient gambles for electoral reasons.
Related literature. Kumhof and Ranciere (2011) also model a link be-
tween inequality and nancial instability. In their model, higher inequality
implies that the poor borrow more from the rich. Thus nancial interme-
diaries have larger balance sheets, which entails larger shocks when (exoge-
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nous) crises occur. Their focus is the on time series of consumption and
savings in an economy without a government. By contrast, we introduce
scal and prudential authorities, and study how inequality endogenously
distorts their incentives.
Surprisingly, the optimal taxation literature based on the Mirrleesian
approach has devoted very little attention to ex post moral hazard in the
form of tax avoidance. Exceptions include Casamatta (2010) and Grochulski
(2007). Grochulski (2007) shows that when the tax avoidance technology
has increasing returns to scale, the optimal tax scheme deters tax avoidance.
Casamatta (2010) shows that this is no longer true when marginal returns
to avoidance decrease. Our paper is the rst, to our knowledge, to fully
solve for the optimal tax scheme in the presence of increasing returns to tax
avoidance.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature that studies Mirrleesian
taxation when the tax authority cannot commit. Recent contributions in-
clude Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009), and Farhi, Sleet, Werning,
and Yeltekin (2011).
2 Increasing Returns to Tax Avoidance: SomeMo-
tivation
Tax evasion may pertain either to outright tax fraud, or to tax avoidance -
the minimization of ones tax liabilities by legal or quasi-legal means. This
paper focusses on the latter. Arguably, such tax avoidance involves impor-
tant xed costs that generate increasing returns to scale. A major source
of tax avoidance is the transformation of labor income into capital income
(dividends or capital gains), which allows to avoid payroll and wage taxes.
The ability of private equity and hedge fund managers to structure their
pay as carried interest, which is taxed as dividends, is an example of such
legal avoidance. This form of tax avoidance involves signicant xed costs
associated with the setup of a business entity to collect dividend income
rather than wages, or with the compensation of tax lawyers. If such xed
costs exist, people who have high incomes are more likely to pay their taxes
as capital income. Consistent with this, there is substantial evidence that at
the top of the distribution, individualsincome includes a disproportionate
fraction of capital and business income (see e.g. Piketty and Saez (2007)).
A second important form of tax avoidance consists of international tax
arbitrage, by locating assets or establishing residence in low-tax countries.
Increasing returns to scale also seem natural in this case: Transportation and
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legal costs have an important xed component. Exploiting inconsistencies in
international accounts, Zucman (2010) estimates that 8% of total household
nancial wealth is held in tax havens. Using data on the geographic mobility
of soccer players, Kleven, Landais and Saez (2010) document a very high
elasticity of location choice to taxes at the top of the distribution.
Notice that tax avoidance may be a major force shaping the tax code, and
yet be limited in practice if the designers of scal policies take tax avoidance
constraints into account (as they do in our model). In this case, increasing
returns to tax avoidance may, as our model predicts, directly translate into
regressive taxes for the most a­ uent . The U.K. tax code o¤ers a striking
example of such regressivity: Eligible individuals (e.g., foreign residents)
can claim the non-U.K. domicile tax status against a lump sum payment
of £ 50,000. This status entails that no income earned outside the U.K. is
reportable to nor taxed by the U.K. tax authorities. Landais, Piketty, and
Saez (2011) show that in France, income taxes have become regressive above
the 5% top income quantile. Analyzing detailed consumer survey data in
Germany, Lang, Norhass, and Stahl (1997) show that the di¤erence between
legislated and e¤ective tax rates increases with respect to income, and that
a sizeable fraction of it is due to the exploitation of legal tax write-o¤s.
3 Increasing Returns to Tax Avoidance and The
Mirrlees Problem
Consider a one-date economy populated by a continuum of individuals with
unit mass. There is a single consumption good. Individuals consume positive
quantities, and have identical preferences represented by an increasing and
strictly concave utility function u such that u0(0) = +1, u(y)y !y!+1 0.
Individuals di¤er only with respect to their endowments of the consumption
good ("wealth"). All endowments are positive. Let F (:) denote the wealth
distribution, which is common knowledge. We suppose thatZ +1
0
wdF (w) < +1;
and that the support of the distribution is equal to [0;+1). The assumption
of an unbounded support is only meant to simplify the discussion. That the
support is an interval is the substantial (and arguably realistic) part of the
assumption.
A social planner seeks to maximize utilitarian welfare. The social plan-
ner faces an informational friction. Each individual privately observes its
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endowment, and can secretly consume all or part of it before reporting the
residual. An individual who reports only y units out of a total endowment
of x secretly consumes G(x; y), where G is continuous, and satises
x  y  0! 0  G(x; y)  x  y: (1)
In words, only a fraction of the wealth that is diverted is available for
consumption, and the residual x   y   G(x; y) (possibly equal to zero) is
wasted. This secret consumption adds up to the amount that the individ-
ual receives after the social planner redistributes the reported fraction of
aggregate wealth.
In application of the Revelation Principle, one can write down the plan-
ners problem using only direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a pair of
functions of wealth (r(w); v(w)) such that an individual with wealth w has
the incentive to report r(w) 2 [0; w], and receives v(r(w)) from the social
planner after doing so. The social planner solves the program (}) :
max
r;v
Z +1
0
u (v(r(w)) +G (w; r(w))) dF (w)
s:t:
8<:
R +1
0 v(r(w))dF (w) 
R +1
0 r(w)dF (w);
8w;w0  0 s:t: r(w0)  w;
v(r(w)) +G (w; r(w))  v(r(w0)) +G (w; r(w0)) :
(2)
The rst inequality in (2) is the resource constraint of the planner. The
other inequalities are incentive-compatibility constraints, ensuring that in-
dividuals truthfully report their types (which of course does not necessarily
imply that they report their entire wealth). We show that the solution to
this program (}) is very simple when the losses from wealth diversion are
subadditive:
Proposition 1
Suppose that for all x  y  z  0;
G(x; y) +G(y; z)  G(x; z): (3)
Then the solution to (}) is attained with (r; v) dened as
r(w) = w;
v(w) = G (w; 0) +
R +1
0 (t G(t; 0)) dF (t);
: (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
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First, Proposition 1 states that there is no tax avoidance in equilibrium.
This result was rst established in Grochulski (2007). This is a direct conse-
quence from (3). The intuition is that any incentive-compatible tax scheme
that implies some diversion can be replaced by a more e¢ cient one that
entails no diversion. To see this, suppose that a mechanism (r; v) impliesR
r(w)dF (w) <
R
wdF (w). Then the social planner might as well devise a
new scheme whereby an individual with wealth w reports w and receives
v(r(w)) +G(w; r(w)) + " for " > 0 su¢ ciently small. We have
v(r(w)) +G(w; r(w))  v(r(w0)) +G(w; r(w0));
 v(r(w0)) +G(w0; r(w0)) +G(w;w0):
The rst line stems from the incentive-compatibility of (r; v), the second
one from (3). This second inequality means that this new mechanism is also
incentive-compatible. It is Pareto improving since the wealth destruction
induced by tax avoidance disappears.
Second, Proposition 1 exhibits the most redistributive scheme among
all "avoidance-free" ones. It simply consists in making every individual
indi¤erent between reporting its entire income or none of it.
4 Limited Commitment, Increasing Returns to Tax
Avoidance, and Excessive Risk Taking
We enrich the previous model as follows. The economy now has two dates,
0 and 1. Individuals receive their endowment at date 0. They value only
consumption at date 1. Let F0 denote the date-0 wealth distribution, which
is assumed to have full support over [0;+1). A risk-free storage technol-
ogy with unit return is available to all individuals for the transfer of their
endowment from date 0 to date 1: A fraction f 2 (0; 1) of the population
may also add to this risk-free return a diversiable (and thus not rewarded)
risky return with any unit-mean distribution. To simplify the discussion,
we assume that this fraction f has the same initial wealth distribution F0
as that of the overall population. The social planner does not observe indi-
vidual risk-taking decisions. Critically, we suppose that the social planner
cannot credibly commit to a date-1 tax scheme at date 0. Thus taxation
is only ex post optimal at date 1, at which the social planner observes the
realized endowment distribution F1 and announces a tax scheme.
For simplicity, we also specify the tax avoidance technology as follows.
We assume that two tax avoidance technologies are available to individuals.
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The rst one dissipates a xed fraction  2 (0; 1) of each diverted unit
of consumption. The second one wastes only     2 (0; ) out of each
diverted consumption unit, but comes at a xed cost c > 0 per individual.
In sum, we assume that
G(x; y) = g(x  y);
with
g(x) = (1  )x+ 1fxcg (x  c) :
Remarks.
1. The lotteries that are available to a fraction the population can be in-
terpreted literally as nancial-risk taking, such as taking on mortgages
with very high loan-to-value ratios or with deferred amortization (e.g.,
interest only or balloon mortgages). Also, the main lever available to
many individuals willing to add risk to their future consumption con-
sists of generating riskier returns to their human capital. Opting for
a career in the nancial services or consulting industries, or becoming
self-employed may generate such risk increases.
2. We focus on idiosyncratic bets with unit return for two reasons. First,
as a result, "excessive risk taking" is simply and clearly dened in our
model as the addition of a fair lottery to a safe endowment by a risk-
averse agent. Second, it delivers sharp insights into the type of risk
distributions that households demand. Section 6 discusses alternative
modellings of the supply of risk.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of this economy. An equilib-
rium is characterized backwards as follows:
- The social planner announces an optimal redistribution scheme after
observing the date-1 wealth distribution F1:
- Rationally anticipating the realization of F1 and the planners decision,
each individual i with risk-taking ability optimally chooses the risk prole
of her storage technology.
- F1 is consistent with the risk proles chosen by the individuals.
Since F0 has full support over [0;+1), then so must F1 since f < 1.
Thus, Proposition 1 applies at date 1. This means that upon observing F1,
the social planner simply implements the scheme
v(w) = g(w) +
Z +1
0
(u  g(u)) dF1(u): (5)
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We now need to solve for the optimal risk-taking of an individual who
can store with risk at date 0 given her endowment and beliefs about F1. Such
an individual i 2 [0; 1] with initial wealth wi faces the following problem:
sup
2B
Z 1
0
u(v(w))d(w) (6)
s: t:
Z 1
0
wd(w) = wi;
where B is the set of Borelian probability measures over [0;+1): Notice
that F1 enters in (6) only to determine the constant term in v. The dual of
problem (6) takes the following form:
inf
(z1; z2)2R2
z1 + wiz2
s: t: 8w  0; z1 + wz2  u(v(w)):
In words, the dual problem minimizes the value at wi of a straight line that
is above the graph of u  v. Proposition 1 in Makarov and Plantin (2011)
shows that the solutions to the primal and dual problems coincide. It is
then easy to derive graphically the solution to the dual problem for a given
arbitrary distribution F1. Recall that v is linear everywhere except for a
convex kink at c. Refer to Figure 1.
Figure 1 here
The concavication of uv - that is, the smallest concave function above
u  v, is equal to u  v outside [w;w], and is the chord between (w; u(v(w))
and (w; u(v(w)) over [w;w].1 The dual problem is solved with the tangent
of u  v outside [w;w] and with this chord otherwise. Thus,(
S (wi) = u(v(wi)) if wi =2 (w;w) ;
S (wi) =
wi w
w w u (v (w)) +
w wi
w w u(v(w)) if wi 2 (w;w) :
This means that individuals who can add risk to the risk-free return do
not do so when wi =2 (w;w), while the others enter into fair binary bets that
pay either w or w with probabilities that depend on wi. Refer to Figure 2.
Figure 2 here
1More precisely, the existence and shape of the concavication of u  v stems from the
concavity of u, the piecewise linearity of v, and the fact that u0(0) = +1, u(y)
y
!
y!+1
0.
8
This solution to investorsproblem given F1 ensures that a candidate
equilibrium F1 must be such that there exists W < c < W such that
- F1 coincides with F0 over [0;W ) and
 
W;+1 ;
- F1 adds a mean preserving spread to F0 over

W;W

. Namely, denoting
F the measure induced by a c.d.f. F;
F1
  
W;W

= (1  f)F0
  
W;W

;
and the residual mass fF0
  
W;W

is split into two atoms of F1, in W
(with mass f
R
(W;W)
W w
W W dF0(w)) andW (with mass f
R
(W;W)
w W
W W dF0(w)).
An equilibrium is then such that w = W and w = W , where (w;w) is
dened above as the interval over which the concavication of u  v (for this
given F1) is linear. Standard compacity and continuity arguments ensure
that the mapping from a pair
 
W;W

into a pair (w;w) has a xed point,
so that there exists at least one equilibrium. Further, that u0(0) = +1,
u(y)
y !y!+1 0 ensures that all equilibrium pairs (w;w) are included in a
compact subset of (0;+1) : The following proposition collects these results.
Proposition 2
There exists an equilibrium. There exists m;M > 0 such that each
equilibrium is fully characterized by two wealth levels w and w satisfying
m < w < c < w < M: In this equilibrium, each individual with the ability
to take risk does so if and only if its initial wealth w belongs to (w;w). In
this case it invests with binary payo¤s fw;wg. The high payo¤ has prob-
ability w ww w . All other individuals invest in the risk-free technology. This
implies that F0 dominates F1 in the sense of second-order stochastic domi-
nance, and that a fraction f of individuals with initial wealth within (w;w)
is transformed into individuals with wealth levels w or w.
Proof. See above.
While we are unable to establish equilibrium uniqueness in general, we
o¤er in Proposition 2 a qualitative description of all equilibria that has
interesting empirical content. Refer to Figure 3:
Figure 3 here
In all equilibria, there is an interval of the wealth distribution containing c
in which a fraction f of the distribution is relocated at the two boundaries of
the interval between dates 0 and 1. We interpret this as a "shrinking middle-
class" phenomenon. People belonging to this "middle class" are risk-averse
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with respect to their post-tax endowment, but risk-loving with respect to
their pre-tax ones because of the convex kink in the tax code. Increasing
returns to tax avoidance thus have an impact on gross inequality because
they induce riskier behavior.
Evidence suggests that the level of idiosyncratic risk taken by individuals
has actually risen over the last thirty years. Dynan et al. (2008) investigates
the volatility of household income using household level data from the PSID,
and nd that the standard deviation of time changes in household-level
income rose by a third from the early 1970s to the early 2000s (see also
Krueger and Perri (2004)). They show that this rise of household income
volatility is due to a greater frequency of very large income changes. Our
model provides a link between less progressive taxes and such increased
individual risk taking.
Notice that the assumption of a kink in c implies that w w is bounded
away from 0 over all equilibria. If alternatively the function g was contin-
uously di¤erentiable, then the occurence of risk shifting would depend on
the relative curvatures of g and u. Regressive taxes at the top would not
necessarily imply ine¢ cient risk-taking by risk-averse agents. Obvious com-
parative statics analysis yields that the lower and upper bounds for w   w
increase when, other things equal, households are less risk-averse and/or 
is larger.
The Value of Commitment
It is instructive to compare this situation of limited commitment with that in
which the social planner can announce a tax scheme at date 0; and credibly
commit to it at date 1: In order to get insights into the value of commitment,
suppose that the social planner commits at date 0 to the tax scheme z(:)
dened as follows. Denote F1 the date-1 wealth distribution associated with
the equilibrium that delivers the largest utilitarian welfare among all possible
equilibria without planners commitment described in Proposition 2. For
this equilibrium, denote ew the random date-1 pre-tax wealth of an individual
with date-0 wealth w. If the individual does not gamble in this equilibrium,
then ew is deterministic, equal to w. If an individual with initial wealth w
gambles, then ew is a binary variable taking values fw;wg with mean w. Let
z(w) = u 1

E

u

g( ew) + Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)

Notice that u  z is equal to the concavication of u  v. Thus scheme z
does not induce risk shifting at date 0 since it is concave by construction.
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Further, we have
Lemma 3
The scheme z satises constraints (2) with F = F0 and G(x; y) = g(x 
y): The resource constraint does not bind.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since the resource constraint does not bind with such a scheme z, it
means that the social planner can strictly improve welfare by adding to
z a constant transfer per individual so that the resource constraint binds.
Thus, commitment power has strictly positive social value. Further, since
scheme z satises contraints (2), it is strictly less e¢ cient than the scheme
that would prevail absent any possibility for individuals to gamble g(w) +R +1
0 (u  g(u)) dF0(u). This readily implies
Proposition 4
Let S0, S1, S2 denote the respective utilitarian welfares when the social
planner cannot commit to a tax scheme, can commit to a tax scheme, and
can ban risk taking (in which case commitment power is immaterial). We
have
S2 > S1 > S0:
Proof. See above.
The intuition behind these results is the following. When taking risk, a
given individual improves her own situation given the tax scheme, but fails
to internalize a negative externality that she creates for other individuals.
This externality stems from the fact that a riskier date-1 wealth distribution
(in the sense of second order stochastic dominance) implies that the date-1
tax scheme is less redistributive: Gambling reduces the expected fraction of
ones date-1 wealth that is available for redistribution. A social planner with
commitment power can alleviate this issue by o¤ering a scheme such as z
that deters risk taking. The idea behind scheme z is that the social planner
implements himself through the tax scheme the concavication of u  v that
individuals realize themselves through costly gambles absent commitment.
This is welfare improving, but still comes at the cost that the social planner
cannot redistribute as much as he would absent gambling.
5 Inequality and Lax Prudential Regulation
The goal of this section is to exhibit plausible political-economy frictions
under which a self-interested politician endorses excessive risk taking at date
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0; even though he has the ability to ban it in principle. Our main result is
that a retrospective component in voting generates such a behavior provided
pre-tax inequalities are su¢ ciently large. Thus, while the previous sections
emphasized the impact of excessive risk taking on inequality, we suggest
here that inequality may in turn pave the way towards lax risk regulation
and excessive risk taking.
We enrich the previous model as follows. We suppose that date-1 taxa-
tion power accrues to the winner of an election. Two politicians, an incum-
bent and his challenger, face o¤ in a date-1 election. After F1 is realized,
they each announce a platform comprised of a redistribution scheme, and
individuals vote according to criteria that we shall describe shortly. At date
0, the incumbent can decide in favor of or against the ban of risk taking.2
Politicians maximize the probability of winning the election.
An important lever available to governments willing to control risk taking
by society is nancial regulation, in particular the prudential regulation of
nancial intermediaries. It consists mainly in fairly technical rules for which
"the devil is in the details." These crucial details are typically not subject
to parliamentary approval, nor much discussed in the public debate. For
example, before the 2008 crisis erupted, how to treat the liquidity options
granted by banks to their SIVs, or how to determine bank capital require-
ments for AAA structured products were questions discussed mainly among
small groups of o¢ cials and experts, even though they directly determined
the e¤ective leverage of banks. Accordingly, we assume that the incumbent
politician has a free hand at making a discretionary regulatory choice at
date 0.
Voting Behavior
We adopt a probabilistic voting framework. We index by 1 the incumbent
politician and by 2 his challenger, and denote by vj each redistribution
scheme, where j 2 f1; 2g. Individual i 2 [0; 1] votes for the incumbent if
u(v1 (wi))  u(v2 (wi)) + ei + e" > 0; (7)
He votes for the challenger if inequality (7) is reversed, and tosses a fair coin
otherwise. The shock e" is a popularity shock that is drawn at date 1 from a
uniform distribution over [  ; ]. The shock ei is individual-specic.
We add a novel component to this otherwise standard probabilistic-
voting framework by assuming that ei is determined retrospectively. Our
goal here is to show in the simplest fashion how a retrospective component
in voting creates a link between wealth inequality and lax risk regulation.
2We discuss a larger space of regulatory choices later.
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Accordingly, we posit a simple form of retrospective voting. We determineei as follows. First, if an individual i willing to take risk is banned from
doing so, then ei =  , where  > 0. This popularity cost may capture lost
campaign nancing from the industry that manufactures gambles. Second,
in case of gambling, ei is equal to  > 0 if is gross endowment increases
between dates 0 and 1, and to   if it decreases.
Retrospective voting is an empirical regularity within many electoral
contexts, in particular in U.S. national elections (see, e.g., Fiorina, 1978,
Kramer, 1971). Here, we posit it as an exogenous behavioral trait, along
the lines of Nordhaus (1975) or Lindbeck (1976). In line with our modelling,
Healy et al. (2010) or Wolfers (2007) o¤er recent evidence suggesting that
shocks that are unrelated to an incumbent politicians ability or e¤ort a¤ect
its probability of reelection. An interesting alternative modelling would
consist in justifying retrospective voting as a disciplining device a la Barro
(1973), or as a vote on competence as in Rogo¤ and Sibert (1987)).3
Suppose that u is bounded above and that
  > supu+ sup f; g . (8)
We study subgame-perfect equilibria. More precisely, an equilibrium can be
described backwards as follows:
- At date 1, after observing history (in particular the realization of F1)
politicians announce platforms that constitute a Nash equilibrium, and vot-
ing takes place.
- Rationally anticipating these platforms, individuals make risk-taking
decisions at date 0 if they are allowed to do so.
- Initially, the incumbent optimally chooses to ban risk taking or not,
trading o¤ the expected costs associated with each decision.
Working our way recursively, we have the following results. First, at date
1, after F1 is determined, condition (8) classically implies that the unique
Nash equilibrium is that politicians o¤er identical platforms that maximize
utilitarian welfare. Thus they both propose the same scheme (5). Given
this, equilibrium risk-taking decisions are characterized by Proposition 2.
It remains to pin down the incumbents initial regulatory decision. This
could be problematic absent uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome of the
risk-taking game. The properties of equilibria established in Proposition 2
su¢ ce, however, to generate insights into what drives the deregulation of
3This would require the additional ingredient that individuals infer something about
the incumbent politician from the outcome of their gambles. This would make the model
considerably more complex, and is left for future research.
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risk taking. To see this, suppose that the incumbent politician expects the
equilibrium of the risk-taking game to be characterized by (w;w) : Banning
risk taking comes at an expected popularity cost equal to
f (F0(w)  F0(w)) ;
while allowing it generates a net retrospective component of the vote equal
to
f
Z
(w;w)

w   w
w   w  
w   w
w   w

dF0(w):
Thus allowing risk taking is desirable if and only if

Z
(w;w)

w   w
w   w  
w   w
w   w

dF0(w) +  (F0(w)  F0(w)) > 0;
or
E

w   w
w   w j w 2 (w;w)

>
1  
2
: (9)
Condition (9) holds (or not) for all feasible equilibria (w;w) in several
interesting cases. Dene (m;M) as in Proposition 2. Suppose that F0 is
concave over [m;M ]. It therefore admits a decreasing density over [m;M ].4
This corresponds to the case in which excessive risk-taking takes place only
at su¢ ciently high income levels. In this case, for all equilibrium (w;w)
E (w j w 2 (w;w)) < w + w
2
;
or
E

w   w
w   w j w 2 (w;w)

<
1
2
: (10)
Since w   w is bounded away from 0 for all feasible equilibria, condition
(9) never holds if, ceteris paribus,  is su¢ ciently small. Risk taking is
detrimental to the incumbent politician in this case because it means that a
majority of the risk takers would like to take "long-shot" bets. Total failures
would outnumber total successes, which overall has a negative impact on the
retrospective component of voting. Symetrically, if F0 is convex over [m;M ],
then (1) is reversed. In this case the incumbent always encourages risk taking
regardless of , , and his beliefs about which risk-taking equilibrium will
be played.
This illustrates that retrospective voting introduces a connection be-
tween pre-tax wealth distribution and risk regulation, because pre-tax wealth
4 If F0 is concave, it is absolutely continuous and thus admits a density.
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distribution drives the risk proles chosen by unconstrained individuals,
which in turn has electoral consequences. It is particularly interesting to
study the impact of pre-tax inequality on risk regulation. In order to simply
parameterize the problem, we suppose that wealth is distributed according
to a power law:
1  F0 (w) =

(  1) I
w

; (11)
where  > 1; 0 < I < c. I is thus average wealth, and ( 1)I is the lower
bound on endowments.5 We also suppose that u is continuously di¤eren-
tiable, and that  < :
Proposition 5
The incumbent politician authorizes risk taking if, ceteris paribus,  and
 are su¢ ciently small. Conversely he bans risk taking for  su¢ ciently
large other things being equal.
Proof. Specication (11) for F0 implies that one can rewrite (9) as
1
x  1


  1
x   x
x   1   1

>
1  
2
(12)
where x = ww :
Thus, if all else equal  ! +1, then the left-hand side of (12) tends
to 0, uniformly over any closed subset of (1;+1) : This implies that the
incumbent bans risk shifting when  is su¢ ciently large.
If all else equal ! 1, then
E

w   w
w   w j w 2 (w;w)

! 1
x  1

x lnx
x  1   1

;
which decreases from 12 to 0 over [1;+1) : To prove the result, it then su¢ ces
to show that all equilibrium thresholds (w;w) are such that x can be made
arbitrarily close to 1 for  su¢ ciently small regardless of the value of .
To see this, notice that all equilibrium thresholds (w;w) satisfy by denition
(1  )u0

g(w) +
Z +1
0
(u  g(u)) dF1(u)

= (1  +)u0

g(w) +
Z +1
0
(u  g(u)) dF1(u)

;
5 Introducing a positive lower bound for wealth distribution does not a¤ect any of the
previous results, except for the fact that there might now be gambling equilibria where
w = ( 1)I

:
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or
(1  )
0@ u0 g(w) + R +10 (u  g(u)) dF1(u)
 u0

g(w) +
R +1
0 (u  g(u)) dF1(u)
 1A (13)
= u0

g(w) +
Z +1
0
(u  g(u)) dF1(u)

The right-hand side is smaller than u0 ((1  )c) and thus tends to 0 as
 ! 0 uniformly over all  and all equilibria (w;w). Since w < c < w
and u0 1 is continuous, equality (13) implies that x can be made arbitrarily
close to 1 for all  and all equilibria (w;w) provided  is su¢ ciently small.
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 5 shows that even if the cost of banning excessive risk tak-
ing  is arbitrarily small, a su¢ ciently high pre-tax inequality induces the
incumbent to encourage gambling. This result may be viewed as a political-
economy version of the risk-shifting problem introduced by Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) in corporate nance. This seminal paper shows that overly lever-
aged rms may undertake value-destroying projects provided these are suf-
ciently risky. Here, an incumbent politician is willing to endorse excessive
risk taking only if he faces su¢ ciently high inequalities. In this case, the
aggregate fractions of successful and unsuccessful risk takers are su¢ ciently
close that savings on costs  o¤set the aggregate electoral costs. Inequality
coupled with retrospective voting spurs ine¢ cient political risk seeking.
6 Extensions
Asymmetric Retrospective Voting
Proposition 5 clearly depends on the particular specication adopted for
retrospective voting. If for example  was a linear function of the households
net prot/loss, then retrospective voting would be immaterial given that
lotteries are fair. In order to assess simply how our results depend on our
particular specication of the retrospective component of the vote, consider
the case in which the individual-specic shock is equal to + (  ) in case
of a positive (negative) wealth change. It is easy to check that ((9) becomes
in this case:
E

w   w
w   w j w 2 [w;w]

>
    
+ +  
:
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We have established that the left-hand side gets close to 1=2 when the right
tail of wealth distribution is fat, to 0 when it is thin. This implies that if
2      +; (14)
then the incumbent politician never encourages ine¢ cient risk taking, while
he does so for a su¢ ciently fat wealth tail when the inequality is reversed.
Overall, it means that risk taking is all the more likely to be promoted when
retrospective voters reward good outcomes more than they punish bad ones,
in line with our interpretation of the model as a political-economy version
of the Jensen-Meckling asset substitution problem.
Partial Risk Regulation
Wealth-contingent regulation
De facto, nancial regulation conditions the amount of risk that an in-
dividual can take on his wealth. For example, hedge funds can tap high
net worth individuals without restriction, but have no direct access to the
general public. Investments that benet from tax subsidies such as retire-
ment savings are typically intermediated by institutions subject to some
prudential regulation. The common justication for this pertains to con-
sumer protection: Investors who are not nancially sophisticated nor can
a¤ord sophisticated advice must be shielded from taking risks that they
do not fully understand nor measure. In our setup, the incumbent politi-
cian would nd such wealth-contingent regulation highly valuable. Since the
probability of success of a gamble increases with the gamblers wealth, the
incumbent could use such a regulation to rule out politically costly long-
shot gambles, and allow only those that have a high probability of success.
This strategic motive for wealth-contingent investor protection is novel, to
our knowledge, and contrasts sharply with the usual rationales that involve
benevolent governments.
Favoring "fake alpha" strategies
The incumbent likes voters to undertake gambles that have a low prob-
ability of failure. Specically, it benets strictly from any gamble that has
a probability of success higher that its probability of failure. If it has the
technology to do so, the incumbent will thus forbid gambles with high prob-
ability of failure (those that the relatively poorer want to undertake) and
will encourage gambles that have a high probability of small gains and a
low probability of a large loss. These risk-proles, labelled by Rajan (2010)
as "fake alpha" strategies, are produced when collecting an insurance risk-
premium against the exposure to a large disaster risk (e.g. carry trade
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strategies) or when "riding a bubble". Such strategies might have been en-
couraged through indirect public subsidies such as the implicit guarantee of
the GSAs.
Endogenous Tax Avoidance Technology and Multiple Equilib-
ria
An interesting extension consists in endogenizing the tax-avoidance tech-
nology. Suppose that the introduction of the costlier and more e¢ cient
avoidance technology     comes at an initial xed investment outlay.
There are several natural interpretations for such an outlay. It can be inter-
preted as the cost of political inuence. It may also be the domestic taxes
lost by a competing country that reduces its tax rates in order to induce
high-net wealth individuals to relocate. In this case, the risk-taking deci-
sions would become strategic complements. If a su¢ ciently high fraction of
the middle class takes risks, then the xed cost is spread among su¢ ciently
many individuals that the sophisticated avoidance technology becomes vi-
able. This vindicates taking risk in the rst place. This could lead to mul-
tiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. In the worst equilibria, maximal risk-taking
would generate important gross inequality, and e¢ cient tax avoidance would
in turn imply that net inequality be important as well.
Slow Adjustment of Taxation to Changes in Tax Avoidance
This paper focusses on equilibrium tax schemes that optimally address the
tax-avoidance friction at date 1. In practice, reforming the tax code is a
protracted process. Thus the tax code is unlikely to contemporaneously
respond to innovations in tax avoidance. In our model, if accordingly the
date-1 tax scheme was exogenously given, and not necessarily optimal - for
example, if it was overly progressive and thus led to date-1 tax avoidance, our
results on the risk-seeking behaviour of middle class individuals would still
hold. The only di¤erence is that their non concave objective at date 0 would
no longer be induced by the ex post optimal tax scheme, but more simply
by their anticipated use of the tax avoidance technology at date 1. Thus, we
believe that the prediction that increasing returns to tax avoidance generate
excessive risk-seeking behaviour should be empirically more pervasive than
the one suggesting that such increasing returns generate regressivity of taxes
at the top. The latter prediction relies on the demanding assumption that
the tax scheme is always constrained-optimal, while the former holds under
fairly arbitrary exogenously given tax schemes.
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Idiosyncratic Versus Systematic Risk Taking
For reasons explained above, the paper simply focusses on a perfectly elastic
supply of idiosyncratic risks at an exogenous expected return. This corre-
sponds to the view that risks are manufactured by a competitive sector.
Notice that in our environment, if a household could gain exposure on a
systematic risk factor that a¤ects the rest of the population, it would ac-
tually value bets that are negatively correlated with it. It is preferable to
be wealthy when redistribution is limited because of a negative aggregate
shock than when it is more generous.
An interesting extension of the model is the study of the polar situa-
tion in which only a xed supply of aggregate risk is available. Intuitively,
the demand of individuals that are close to the tax kink would induce low,
or perhaps negative risk premia, akin to an apparent overpricing. Analyt-
ical solutions for risk premia in the presence of heterogeneous agents with
nonconcave preferences seem di¢ cult to obtain, however.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. We rst show that a tax scheme that satises constraints (2) and
such that Z
r(w)dF (w) <
Z
wdF (w) (15)
cannot be optimal. From such a scheme (r; v), x " > 0 and dene the
scheme (r; v) as
r(w) = w;
v(w) = v(r(w)) +G(w; r(w)) + ":
Clearly, this new scheme is strictly preferable to (r; v) because it deliv-
ers more consumption at any income level. This new scheme is incentive-
compatible: For all w  w0, we have
v(r(w)) +G(w; r(w)) + "  v(r(w0)) +G(w; r(w0)) + ";
 v(r(w0)) +G(w0; r(w0)) +G(w;w0) + ":
The rst inequality stems from the fact that (r; v) is incentive-compatible,
and the second one follows from (3). Further, this new scheme (r; v) is
feasible for " su¢ ciently small because it does not waste resources through
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tax avoidance while (r; v) does from (15). Thus, (r; v) satises (2) for "
su¢ ciently small and strictly dominates (r; v), which establishes the result.
Thus, one can assume r(w) = w w.l.o.g.
Step 2. Consider the following auxiliary program (}0) :
max
v
Z +1
0
u (v(w)) dF (w)
s:t:
 R +1
0 v(w)dF (w) 
R +1
0 wdF (w);
8w  0; v(w)  G (w; 0) + v(0): (16)
We will show that
V (w) = G (w; 0) +
Z +1
0
(t G(t; 0)) dF (t)
attains the solution of (}0). Notice that V satises (16).
Consider a function v that attains the solution of (}0). Clearly, v must
be (weakly) increasing. Thus, v admits a right limit v(x ) and a left limit
v(x+) at each point x 2 (0;+1). Suppose that for some x0 2 (0;+1) ;
v(x 0 ) < v(x
+
0 ). Then one could slightly increase v in the left neighborhood
of x, slightly decrease it in the right neighborhood, and thus strictly increase
social welfare while still satisfying constraints (16). Thus v must be con-
tinuous over (0;+1) (and with a similar argument also right-continuous in
0).
Suppose now that for some x1 2 (0;+1),
v(x1) > G (x1; 0) + v(0): (17)
Since v and G are continuous, inequality (17) actually holds over some neigh-
borhood 
 of x1. Consider a bounded measurable function h with support
within 
 s.t.
R
hdF = 0. The function
w ! v(w) + th(w)
satises constraints (16) for t su¢ ciently small. Thus it must be that
(t) =
Z +1
0
u (v(w) + th(w)) dF (w)
has a local maximum in 0, or that
0(0) =
Z +1
0
u0 (v(w))h(w)dF (w) = 0:
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since it holds for any function h, it must be that v is constant over 
.
Clearly this implies that v must be constant over [0; x1), which cannot be
unless G(:; 0) is equal to 0 over this interval. In any case, this contradicts
(17). Thus v = V .
Since constraints (16) are necessary conditions for constraints (2) and V
happens to satisfy (2) from (3), this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3
We have
z(w) = u 1

E

u

g( ew) + Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)

:
To see that z strictly satises the resource contraint, notice that for all w;
u 1

E

u

g( ew) + Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)

 E

g( ew) + Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)

by convexity of u 1, with strict inequality whenever ew 6= w, which occurs
for a nonnegigible set of individuals. Thus,Z +1
0
z(w)dF0(w) <
Z +1
0
E

g( ew) + Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)

dF0(w)
=
Z +1
0
E (g( ew)) dF0(w) + Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)
=
Z +1
0
g(w)dF1(w) +
Z +1
0
(t  g(t)) dF1(t)
=
Z +1
0
tdF1(t) =
Z +1
0
tdF0(t):
It remains to show that z does not induce tax avoidance at date 1. This is
because the function z(w)   z(0) is increasing, convex, and larger than g:
Thus
z(w)  z(0)  z(w   w0)  z(0) + z(w0)  z(0);
 g(w   w0) + z(w0)  z(0):
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Figure 1. The function uov and its concavification.
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Figure 2. Risk taking.
Figure 3. The shrinking middle class. 
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